It’s Coming

In the German Navy

Germany’s hopes for a new generation of large frigates have turned into a defense procurement disaster. This €10 billion project has been severely delayed due to a chain reaction of software problems, design flaws, and out-of-control costs, and may even lead to the replacement of the prime contractor. What was originally a flagship project symbolizing the rebuilding of European military power has instead exposed systemic problems, including friction in cross-border cooperation, overly complex specifications, and rigid bureaucratic processes, reducing construction speed to only 20-30% of the original plan.

Ironically, as NATO strengthens its Baltic defenses, these crucial warships may not be delivered on schedule, directly impacting strategic deployments. At a deeper level, this reflects the state of the European defense industry as a whole. On one hand, Germany’s procurement system demands extreme detail, even specifying door handles and switches, resulting in lengthy processes. On the other hand, cultural and operational differences in cross-border cooperation have significantly increased communication and execution costs. The end result is that costs have ballooned from over €5 billion to potentially exceeding €16 billion.

Bullet Points:

** Vlad-the-Impaler did not deport illegal aliens. He made examples of them. Let’s talk about Vlad.

** How much for a dog and a drink?

** HMS Dragon was sent to the Med to defend Cyprus, but it broke down. The Brits are now calling it HMS Lazy Lizard. Katie Hopkins discusses the situation. Then she gets into greasy poles and hookers working Polish building sites and so forth…moving on, the wealthy are leaving the UK – but who will pay for everything when the job creators have left?

** LSP is talking about a new Irish rising and how the new constabulary tactics mimic those of the old Black and Tans. Apparently, Irishmen don’t wish to be replaced by Muslims. Imagine that.

**”All governments suffer a recurring problem: Power attracts pathological personalities. It’s not that power corrupts, but that it is magnetic to the corruptible.” – Frank Herbert (Chapterhouse Dune) Power always reveals. When a guy has enough power to do what he has always wanted to do, you see what he has always wanted to do.

** Is President Trump a feminist?

** Turkey rising (analysis).

** Are California’s beaches filled with hate? Carrola makes an observation. Having spent a large part of my life in California and on its beaches, I can’t recall ever seeing hate. I do recall seeing love – and sometimes too much of that – on the sand – in public. Or maybe it was simply their urgent need to make babies. But I digress.

** Is the Moon’s orbit too perfect to be natural?

** Ferguson’s Law states that any great power that spends more on debt servicing than on defense risks ceasing to be a great power.

** Should you leave a tip? Let’s take it to another level.

Blocking the Straits

A lot of people hear “Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz” and picture a wall of warships stretched across the water. That’s not how it works. It’s not how it has ever worked. Understanding what “blocking” actually means is the key to understanding why Iran’s leverage was real — and why destroying it was essential.

Let’s cast the runes and gaze into the future before we chat about the present. Bloomberg just laid it out plain: Iran’s stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz is fading and won’t recover. Over the next five years, Gulf states are racing to build bypass pipelines that sidestep Tehran’s choke point, slashing the mullahs’ leverage for good. The recent shaky US-Iran ceasefire showed Tehran still trying to play tough guy with oil flows. But Saudi Arabia and the UAE are already expanding their east-west routes to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman, moving millions of barrels of oil daily without touching Iranian waters. Kuwait and Iraq have strong reasons to join in and cut the cord completely. Even if short-term deals patch things up, Iran’s dominance over this vital waterway—which carries one-fifth of global oil and LNG—is toast. Iran’s threats spiked prices and rattled markets, yet smart neighbors refused to stay dependent on a terrorist sponsor’s mercy.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐆𝐞𝐨𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐩𝐡𝐲

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway between Iran to the north and the UAE and Oman to the south, connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the open ocean. At its narrowest point, it’s roughly twenty-one miles wide (EIA). But the usable shipping lanes are far smaller than that because it’s shallow. Ships follow a traffic separation scheme: one two-mile-wide lane inbound, one two-mile-wide lane outbound, separated by a two-mile buffer zone (Strauss Center). That’s six miles of navigable channel. Every single ship carrying oil out of the Persian Gulf funnels through those lanes. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire northern edge.

The Weenie

In 2025, an average of 𝟐𝟎 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐬 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐝𝐚𝐲 of crude oil and petroleum products moved through the Strait — roughly 20% of total world petroleum consumption and about 𝐨𝐧𝐞-𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐠𝐥𝐨𝐛𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐛𝐨𝐫𝐧𝐞 𝐜𝐫𝐮𝐝𝐞 𝐨𝐢𝐥 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞 (EIA, IEA). Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Bahrain, and Iran itself all export through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the crisis, an average of 135 tankers per day transited the strait (Wikipedia — 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis). That number dropped to 𝟏𝟎 after Iran started attacking ships.

A single fully loaded VLCC — a Very Large Crude Carrier, the standard supertanker — holds 𝟐 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐬 of oil. At current crude prices, that’s roughly $𝟏𝟑𝟎 𝐭𝐨 $𝟏𝟔𝟎 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 worth of cargo in one hull (EIA, industry estimates). The ship itself is worth another $120 million. So every supertanker transiting those six miles of water represents roughly 𝐚 𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐞𝐫-𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐝𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐬 of combined value — crawling through a channel at 12 knots, two miles wide, within range of the Iranian coast.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 “𝐁𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐤𝐚𝐝𝐞” 𝐓𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐈𝐬𝐧’𝐭 𝐚 𝐁𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐤𝐚𝐝𝐞

Iran never physically sealed the Strait. It didn’t stretch a chain across it. It didn’t need to. What Iran did was make the 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐬𝐨 𝐡𝐢𝐠𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 virtually nobody was willing to try.

On March 2, Iran announced it would “𝘢𝘵𝘵𝘢𝘤𝘬 𝘢𝘯𝘺 𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘱 𝘵𝘳𝘺𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘰 𝘱𝘢𝘴𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘰𝘶𝘨𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘏𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘶𝘻” (Al Jazeera). Then it backed up the threat. The International Maritime Organization confirmed 𝟏𝟖 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐬 𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐥𝐬 in the first three weeks alone — by March 24, over 20 ships had been hit (CNN, Wikipedia). One of those was the Kuwaiti oil tanker 𝘈𝘭 𝘚𝘢𝘭𝘮𝘪, struck by an Iranian drone at midnight on March 30.

That’s all it took. You don’t need to sink every ship. You need to sink 𝐞𝐧𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡 of them so that the rest won’t come.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 $𝟐𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝐖𝐞𝐚𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐯𝐬. 𝐭𝐡𝐞 $𝟏𝟔𝟎 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐓𝐚𝐫𝐠𝐞𝐭

This is where it gets obscene. Iran’s primary weapon for disrupting the most important shipping lane on Earth is the Shahed-136 — a one-way attack drone that costs between $𝟐𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝐚𝐧𝐝 $𝟓𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎 to build (CNBC, CSIS). Iran was producing an estimated 𝟐𝟎𝟎 𝐭𝐨 𝟓𝟎𝟎 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐦𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐡 even under international sanctions (Eurasia Review). It’s small, slow, hard to detect over water, and carries enough explosive to cripple a tanker’s hull.

The math is devastating. A $20,000 drone versus a $250 million target. Even if 90% of drones are intercepted, the ones that get through cause catastrophic damage. And here’s the kicker — the interceptor missiles used to shoot them down cost $𝟑 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨 $𝟏𝟐 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐞𝐚𝐜𝐡 (Arab News). For every dollar Iran spends on a Shahed, the defending nation spends $𝟐𝟎 𝐭𝐨 $𝟐𝟖 shooting it down (CSIS). That’s not a weapons system. That’s an economic weapon.

𝐌𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐈𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝐓𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭

Drones are just the visible part. Iran is estimated to possess between 𝟐,𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝟔,𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝐧𝐚𝐯𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬 (Stimson Center, Arab News). During the 2026 crisis, Iran began laying mines in the strait on March 10 (CNN). The IRGC Navy used fast attack boats to deploy them — each small boat can carry two or three mines per sortie, and they operate in swarms at 𝟓𝟎 𝐭𝐨 𝟕𝟎 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐭𝐬, making them extremely difficult to intercept (Gulf News, Strauss Center).

A mine doesn’t care if there’s a U.S. carrier battle group in the neighborhood. It sits at the bottom of the shallow channel. It waits. A single contact mine from the 1980s — the same type Iran used in the Tanker War — nearly sank the USS 𝘚𝘢𝘮𝘶𝘦𝘭 𝘉. 𝘙𝘰𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘴 in 1988 (History). A mine costs a few thousand dollars. A VLCC supertanker has no armor, no countermeasures, and a thin steel hull designed to carry oil, not absorb explosions.

𝐖𝐡𝐲 “𝐉𝐮𝐬𝐭 𝐄𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐭 𝐓𝐡𝐞𝐦” 𝐃𝐨𝐞𝐬𝐧’𝐭 𝐖𝐨𝐫𝐤

The obvious response is: why not just escort tankers with warships? The problem is scale and geography. At 135 transits per day before the crisis, you’d need a permanent naval armada rotating through a two-mile-wide lane around the clock. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire northern edge of the strait — every square mile of that channel is within range of shore-launched drones, anti-ship missiles, and coastal artillery. During the 1980s Tanker War, the U.S. escorted Kuwaiti tankers under Operation Earnest Will, yet Iran 𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐥 carried out 168 attacks on commercial ships (Wikipedia — Tanker War). Over 400 civilian sailors were killed. You can’t put a missile defense umbrella over every tanker in a two-mile lane for months on end. And the insurance industry doesn’t care about your military capability — it cares about 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐥 𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐈𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐊𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐒𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐜𝐡

This is how a “blockade” actually works. Before the crisis, war-risk insurance for a tanker transiting the Gulf cost 𝟎.𝟎𝟐% 𝐭𝐨 𝟎.𝟎𝟓% of the vessel’s value — roughly $40,000 for a $120 million ship (Euronews, Bloomberg). After Iran started attacking ships in March 2026, premiums surged 𝟑𝟎𝟎% (Euronews). The rate jumped to 𝟏% 𝐭𝐨 𝟓% 𝐨𝐟 𝐡𝐮𝐥𝐥 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐮𝐞 — meaning that same $120 million ship now costs $𝟔𝟎𝟎,𝟎𝟎𝟎 𝐭𝐨 $𝟔 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 to insure for a single voyage (Bloomberg, Insurance Journal). Some insurers 𝐜𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐰𝐚𝐫-𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐤 𝐜𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐲 (Al Jazeera, CNBC).

When your insurance company says, “We won’t cover you if you go through Hormuz,” you don’t go through Hormuz. It doesn’t matter that the U.S. Fifth Fleet is right there. No insurance means no shipping company will authorize the voyage. No voyage means no oil. Iran doesn’t need to sink a fleet. It needs to 𝐬𝐩𝐨𝐨𝐤 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐫𝐬.

𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐬

When Iran “blocked” the Strait of Hormuz, daily transits dropped from 𝟏𝟑𝟓 𝐭𝐨 𝟏𝟎 (Wikipedia). The IEA confirmed that the disruption removed roughly 𝟐𝟎 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐬 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐝𝐚𝐲 from global supply — the largest oil market disruption in history (IEA). Brent crude briefly approached $𝟏𝟎𝟎 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐥, and analysts warned it could reach $ 𝟏𝟐𝟎 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐛𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐥 or higher if the blockade persisted (Al Jazeera Center for Studies). Global shipping rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles and weeks to delivery times.

All of that — done with drones that cost less than a new pickup truck, mines that cost less than a used sedan, and fast boats that Iran builds in coastal warehouses.

𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐃𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐨𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐫𝐚𝐧’𝐬 𝐍𝐚𝐯𝐲 𝐖𝐚𝐬𝐧’𝐭 𝐄𝐧𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡

Operation Epic Fury sank 𝟏𝟓𝟎+ 𝐈𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐧𝐚𝐯𝐚𝐥 𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐥𝐬 and destroyed 90% of the regular fleet (Department of War). But the asymmetric threat was never the conventional navy — it was the drones, the mines, and the IRGC’s small attack boats hidden in caves and tunnels along the coast. The Stimson Center reported that even after Epic Fury, Iran retained 𝟖𝟎 𝐭𝐨 𝟗𝟎% 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐬𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐛𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐲𝐞𝐫𝐬 (Stimson Center). That’s why Secretary Hegseth reported 95% of naval mines neutralized and 700+ mine strikes — because the mines were the real threat, not the ships.

The ceasefire terms requiring Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz aren’t just about navigation rights. They’re about dismantling the infrastructure that allowed a regime with a $20,000 drone to hold 𝟐𝟎% 𝐨𝐟 𝐠𝐥𝐨𝐛𝐚𝐥 𝐨𝐢𝐥 𝐬𝐮𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐲 hostage.

161 Years and a Day Ago

Identify the Aircraft

1

I think it’s the first CASEVAC aircraft.

2

Identify the Ship

End